industrial farm businesses over smallscale family farms. But the transition has not been smooth and nor is it complete. Family farms, big and small, continue to operate within the Canadian agricultural landscape (Statistics Canada, 2007 , 2014 . This diversity is indicative of competing agricultural agendas and practices. Bollman (2007) contends the three ''fundamental drivers'' of change in rural communities are commodity prices, technological advancements, and shifts in population demographics -especially rural outmigration. In contrast, Mattison and Norris (2005) argue that rural land use changes according to how markets, policy, technology and environmental factors (geographic and social) converge at different times and places. This paper follows Mattison and Norris (2005) , in arguing that policy development must be taken into account when studying the transformation of agriculture. It does so on the basis of two points. First, none of the ''drivers'' identified can actually act in and of themselves. It is people who are acting within the parameters of their localities and markets and making choices about what to do based on current commodity prices, available technologies, employment opportunities, and service amenities. Demographics change when people decide to move from one locale to another. Markets and prices change when people switch the menu on their plates, or when producers look for new opportunities. Secondly, the essential goal of policy is to change behavior (Lightman, 2003) . Policy is a blueprint of what should be done in order to create desired outcomes. In the case of agriculture, what policy agenda was promoted and to what extent did stakeholders embrace it ''on the ground'' through their day-to-day activities and practices? This fundamental question is addressed through a case study of policy developments and farming practices in New Brunswick, Canada. The paper begins with an overarching presentation of the discourses embedded in national and provincial agricultural policy documents. It then uses aggregate data from Statistics Canada to document shifts in rural farm household practices. As the section Evidence of shifting agricultural practices in Canada reveals, not all family farms in New Brunswick have embraced the dominant policy discourse. The paper's concluding discussion situates this resistance within larger questions and debates about small-scale agriculture.
Shifting agricultural policy discourses in Canada
Policy implies choices. Each time a choice is made to follow one direction, another is effectively abandoned. Reconciling competing interests within a given policy framework is difficult (Lightman, 2003) . In Canada, agricultural policy development is particularly challenging: first, because of the geographic size and diversity of farm sectors throughout the country; and second, because agriculture is a joint federal-provincial-territorial responsibility (Skogstad, 2008) . Consequently agricultural policy development occurs at two government levels: national and provincial (territorial). While Canada's ten provinces and three territories work with federal agendas and regulations, they have the capacity to adapt and move policies in different directions if doing so allows them to address local issues and meet the needs of dominant interests. This section briefly reviews the vision of agriculture in national and provincial policies over the past 40 years.
National agricultural policy development
In the post-World War II era, Canadian agricultural practices have been guided by an extensive number of policies. Skogstad's (2008) detailed policy review concludes that national policy has followed three distinct paths. It has taken a state assistance approach to improve farm incomes and the overall economic wellbeing of farm households. More recently it has adopted a trade liberalization model seeking to make Canadian agriculture conform to neo-liberal global marketplace goals. And for a short time between these two dominant policy agendas, national policy endorsed the European multifunctionality framework for rationalizing investment in particular income stability programs. To some extent all three policy trajectories have been preoccupied with improving family farm incomes because, regardless of their physical size or farm cash receipts, family farm households have been increasingly reliant on off-farm incomes (Bessant, 2006; Frigon, 2007) . Since the 1970s, farms have routinely been caught in cost-price squeezes where farm gate prices are substantially lower than farm input costs. To stay afloat and keep farming, farmers have habitually borrowed money for everyday operating expenses, resulting in massive collective debt. At the end of 2010 Canadian farmers owed over $63 billion dollars ($1 = s0.75) to lending institutions (Biggs et al., 2011) . Financial troubles -often the upshot of grand expansion schemes -have led to the closure of many family farm operations (Bessant, 2006; Frigon, 2007) . While state assistance, multifunctionality, and market liberalization are all policy directives pursued to address the farm financial crisis, the three are not entirely compatible. Each reflects a different ideological framework embedded in the larger socioeconomic, cultural and political debates at the time of their adoption. The 1950s and 60s saw the growth of the welfare state in Canada, where many social programs were designed to cast a wide social safety net and improve the social wage. By the 1970s Keynesian economics was starting to lose favor and the government's willingness to support family farms through direct assistance waned. During this period the goal of policy was to ''rationalize, consolidate and expand production volumes above all else'' (Winson, 1988) . The need for family farms to become profitable businesses, rather than ''lifestyles'' or sources of livelihood, was being strongly promoted in the late 1960s vision for agriculture (Canada, 1969) . In the 1980s farms that were not turning into profitable businesses were perceived as failures (Winson, 1988) . These ''failure'' farms were hindering the expansionist goals of business oriented farmers who needed land to increase production capacity. To support the growth and development model, farm credit programs were developed, along with management and training programs and scientific research programs focused on increasing yields. By the 1990s, this agenda was further embraced through a laissez-faire market liberalization strategy, which promoted the internationalization of Canadian agriculture (Kittson, 2011) and effectively prioritized corporate agricultural interests. What has followed is a debate over whether the purpose of the food system is to ''grow dollars'' or ''grow food''. The tension within Agriculture and Agri-food Canada (AAFC) policy stems from trying to address two divergent goals: on one hand, promote policy that supports competitive, free market economic policy objectives; and on the other, promote social policy dimensions aimed at improving the social wellbeing of farm households. In recent years the solution has been to reconcile the two agendas by turning income stability, financial security, and economic wellbeing into a ''sustainability '' issue (AAFC, 2011) . The principal dimension of farm ''sustainability'' that is judged is profitability. Farms not filled with ''individual players'' who have the ''knowledge, skills and tools'' to ensure business acumen, innovation, risk management and entrepreneurialism are judged ''unsustainable'' (AAFC, 2011) . Profitability across farm sectors and at the farm level is supposed to be achieved through enhanced markets, strategic positioning and investment in research and innovation. Engaging these policy initiatives is critical from a neoliberal perspective: ''The competitiveness of the agriculture and agrifood sector depends on its ability to remain profitable and viable over the long term'' (Kittson and Smith, 2013) . As this policy framework has emerged, the discourse surrounding farming has shifted. Current policy documents make little or no reference to farmers and farm families. Instead they refer to competitors, entrepreneurs, individual players, trading partners, the agri-food sector, the industry or consumers. This prevailing market language clearly indicates for whom the policies are written. Skogstad (2008) argues that the objective of aligning Canadian farming practices with international trade regulations has led to a major paradigm shift within AAFC. She concludes that agriculture is being internationalized via free trade agreements and market liberalization, which effectively favor foreign investors rather than domestic producers (Skogstad, 2008) .
Provincial agricultural policy development
In Europe, due to the two-tiered process between policy development and implementation, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) can be massaged to meet the particular needs of member states (Labarthe and Laurent, 2013) . Similarly in Canada, national policy directives can be taken up at the provincial and territorial level in different ways. New Brunswick, like other Canadian provinces, has the capacity to advance national agricultural mandates and programs in ways that best serve their particular circumstances (Skogstad, 2008) . Though a small province, New Brunswick has been selected to examine the interplay between national and provincial levels of policy and practice because it remains one of Canada's most rural populations and is the birthplace of McCain Foods International (Stoffman, 2007) . Located on the East Coast of Canada, with a landmass of 71,400 square kilometers, New Brunswick, in 2011, had a population of 751,000 (Statistics Canada, 2012a) . Economically the province continues to be highly dependent on natural resource industries, including farming, so it is an ideal site to study the relations between shifting policy aims and their impact on local food systems and farm practices. Until World War II, farming was an integral part of rural New Brunswick. In the mid-1950s family owned and operated farms provided employment to 29.1% of the province's total population. But by 1971 -essentially one generation later -only 4.3% of the population continued to farm (Statistics Canada, 1997) . The rapid losses in farm population and census farms prompted the New Brunswick government of the time to conduct a three-year Agricultural Resources Study (ARS) to investigate how provincial resources could best be mobilized to ''maximize farm income, to strengthen the vitality of the family farm, to encourage new job creation in food processing industries and to increase food production' ' (New Brunswick, 1977) . Coming on the heels of the 1969 Canadian Agricultural Task Force report, the ARS documented the province's interest in sustaining family farms while promoting the growth of food processing industries. Food processors were and are dependent on ever increasing amounts of raw material at ever-lower prices to sustain their growth and profits (Winson, 1985) . To meet the needs of food processors, the state encouraged farms to expand, mechanize and modernize into ''costeffective commercial operations''. During this period, prosperous farms provided a ''reasonable return on investment'' and stood in sharp contrast to family farms providing only a livelihood (New Brunswick, 1974 , 1977 . The vision of farming as a profit-oriented business is clearly advanced in early policy documents: ''It is urgently necessary to provide an economic climate in which farmers can expand their operations (. . .)The thrust of the policies of the Department of Agriculture, particularly in meeting market needs must be with aiding the commercial farmer and the efficient producer, and in adding to the numbers of such operators. The future of agriculture must be oriented towards. . .larger farm-units not only for increased production efficiency, but also to structure units that are large enough to afford better management' ' (New Brunswick, 1974) . In short, the policy imperative at the provincial level emulated the federal one: to eliminate small, economically ''inefficient'' operations (even if they provided livelihoods and food security to many rural families) in favor of ''business-oriented'' farms. While supporting profit-oriented, productivist agriculture became the mandate of the province throughout the 1970s, successive provincial governments supported this agenda through a systematic shift in the kinds of programs they funded and how they referred to the farm community. For example, by 1998 the New Brunswick government no longer made any mention of farmers, farm businesses, or family farms in their mission statement, mandates or objectives. Instead their goal was: ''To increase the level of economic activity in the agri-food industry and promote entrepreneurship and economic growth in New Brunswick' ' (New Brunswick, 1998) . Among their defining principles they intended to: -provide clients with the appropriate tools for growth, development and increased self-reliance, such as information systems, access to capital, risk management, training, technology, and technical expertise; -maximize returns from the market; -create a healthy ''entrepreneurial environment'' through the reduction of unnecessary regulations and other barriers to development (New Brunswick, 1998) . Under market liberalization policies, farmers officially became ''entrepreneurs'' and ''clients'' who must maximize their profits to be deemed successful. Betty Brown, a New Brunswick farm woman activist, reports that this is when the government stopped inviting farm women and small farmers to meetings: ''Before 1998 we were asked to go to meetings, to go to Ottawa, we were asked our opinion but that slowed down really fast'' (Comments from the farm community are from public events, conferences and interviews undertaken through a participatory action research model). This policy language indicates why: the government re-identified who their stakeholders were and shifted their priorities. Small and mediumsized farms were no longer their constituents.
Evidence of shifting agricultural practices in Canada
To be effective policy must be ''taken up'' by those it is meant to guide. What then were the impacts of these shifting discourses on farm practices? This section explores the extent to which the policy vision of ''bigger'', more productive, farms began to take hold at both the national and provincial levels through an examination of Statistics Canada data on farm size.
Changing policies, changing practices: the structural transformation of Canadian agriculture Rural sociologists and agricultural economists throughout the 1970s and 80s documented the structural transformation of Canadian agriculture (Ehrensaft and Bollman, 1985; Ghorayshi, 1986; Goddard et al., 1993; Statistics Canada, 1997) . Their work captured how farm size and production capacity were expanding, farm numbers contracting, and farm capitalization, mechanization and technological innovation transforming the rural landscape. Table 1 illustrates how Canadian farm numbers steadily declined while average farm size continued to expand. Of course these aggregate changes were partly due to agricultural science, farm specialization, chemical fertilizers and other inputs. But they also demonstrate that the policy vision, was indeed being enacted, along with the programs it spawned. These structural changes occurred precisely because farm families changed their practices. They did so because the policy agenda and the incentive programs emerging from it were designed to garner these effects. Statistical data simply reflects what people are doing: practices must change for the system to change. In studying structural level changes, some researchers emphasized the aggregate data trends while others investigated the day-to-day decisionmaking and modus operandi of family farm households. What emerged from this second research agenda was a rich analysis of life and work on the farm: an understanding of how family farm households juggled family and farm life, how they coped with economically challenging circumstances, and their ongoing motivations for farming (Friedmann, 1980; Ghorayshi, 1986; Statistics Canada, 1997) . This research captured the competing strategies families used to retain their farm units. It was cognizant of how policies and programs produced winners and losers: some farmers were riding the wave while others, due to debt burdens (from growing too fast), were entirely out of the game.
Changing policies, changing practices: the New Brunswick case Table 2 illustrates that fewer but ''bigger'' farms were also becoming de rigueur in rural New Brunswick. Farm number shrinkage occurred in tandem with farm size increases because arable land is finite. Situated in the midst of this changing agricultural scene was McCain Foods Ltd. Over the intervening years it grew from a small local company into a multinational with operations on all continents (Stoffman, 2007) . In the long run McCain Food faired much better than the local farms growing potatoes under their contracts (Senopi, 1980; Murphy, 1982; Winson, 1985) . McCain expanded by taking advantage of government programs and grants aimed at assisting the growth of the processing industry (New Brunswick, 1977; Senopi, 1980; Stewart, 1974; Murphy, 1982 (Branch, 1983 ). Yet clearly they were going broke. Structural changes in farm numbers document this fact. But farm expansion and specialization meant the sector was able to sustain acreage and yields with a fraction of the number of farms. This pattern of sustained capacity with fewer farms has continued (AAFC, 2014 (2007) documents. Most likely industry and government are retroactively recalibrating historical data to emphasize farms meeting a certain revenue class. This is in keeping with their policy agenda. Likewise the potato industry routinely argues New Brunswick is well suited to growing potatoes (AAFC, 2014), when it is probably more accurate to say the political climate has been well suited for McCain Foods and their agenda of processing potatoes. True, before the entry of McCain's processing facilities, potatoes were grown throughout the province. But over the past forty years, production has become increasingly concentrated in the three counties -Victoria, Madawaska and Carleton -that surround the two processing plants (Murphy, 1982) . Historically over forty varieties of potatoes were grown in New Brunswick; this quickly dwindled to four dominant varieties based on what McCain wanted for making the best French fries (Murphy, 1982) . Russet Burbank is the variety that makes the most pleasing French fry, but it takes 10-14 days more to mature than the typical New Brunswick growing season. Murphy (1982) argued the variety of potatoes grown in New Brunswick followed the needs of the processor rather than those of the farmers. For McCain Foods to grow and expand their operations within the province they needed a reliable and steady supply of cheap inputs (Senopi, 1980; Stewart, 1974) . Fewer, bigger, more (Statistics Canada, 2007 , 2012a , *2012b and AAFC, 2014 dependent potato operators presented the ideal scenario for meeting McCain's growing production needs (Senopi, 1980; Murphy, 1982 Differences in performance between farms can be explained by this diversity. Some farm families rely more on off-farm income to help them manage uncertainty due to production and marketing risk, and others diversify production'' (Kittson, 2011) . Interestingly such diversity is seldom framed as a form of resistance to the dominant policy agenda. Yet small and medium-sized farmers do perceive themselves as engaged in a different agenda than the policy adherents. They self-identify as farmers engaged in sustainable agriculture (Machum, 2005 ''marginal'' (New Brunswick, 2010) . The prevalence of ''very small'' farms in New Brunswick -and other parts of Canada (Esqueda, 2012) -is evidence that significant numbers did not embrace the policy agenda. Yet Statistics Canada routinely omits farms with less than $10,000 in revenue from their analytic calculations (Statistics Canada, 2012b) . By ignoring their existence the government has effectively written off farms that resist the policy imperative to ''get big or get out''.
Conclusion
What is unfolding in New Brunswick is not unique. At the national and international level there is a struggle going on over farm practices and future food systems (Desmarais et al., 2010) . On one hand, organizations like Via Campesina and Community Supported Agriculture are promoting small-scale food production geared to local needs and markets; on the other, corporate agriculture continues to promote large-scale industrial farming for export markets. Despite evidence that alternative farming models are beneficial both ecologically and socially, dominant agricultural policies continue to sideline them (Latruffe and Mann, 2015) . These competing agricultural visions, and the farming practices they implicitly and explicitly endorse, have their roots in fundamentally different policy visions of best practices. At a global level the policy agenda has been to expand production with larger and larger, more efficient farms. Yet even throughout Europe small and medium-size farms continue to dot the rural countryside. Castro et al. (2014) note farm size reflects past cultural practices so ''the presence of small farms is more concentrated in Mediterranean Europe and in some countries of Eastern Europe''. Regional variation is also evident in Canada. Esqueda (2012) argues small farms in the Maritimes, which includes New Brunswick, are more likely to succeed (Labarthe and Laurent, 2013) , and here too ''small farms have progressively vanished from the policy agenda'' (Labarthe and Laurent, 2013) . Castro et al. (2014) perceive them as gaining ground in current CAP programs because they ''act as social buffers'' during challenging economic times. Mann (2014) offers a different interpretation arguing small-scale agriculture is a ''luxury item'', delivering luxury goods (i.e. local, unique rather than mass-produced foodstuffs) and it persists for nostalgic reasons. It is ironic that farms that have hitherto been disregarded and marginalized by policymakers, researchers and consumers are now suddenly being reframed as occupying a niche market when little to nothing has changed in terms of their actual day-to-day practices.
What is evident here is that as policy changed so too did farm practicesbut the take-up was always incomplete because some refused to follow. Focusing our analytic spotlight on the sheer percentage of farms that remain ''small'' in terms of physical and revenue size in New Brunswick and Canada raises questions about the true effectiveness of the past forty years of policy development. Policy without uptake is ineffective; and practices that persist completely outside policy frameworks are generally marginalized. It is here on the margins that New Brunswick's small and medium-sized farms have tenaciously held on, weathering storm after storm, maintaining their livelihoods and protecting farmland from other developments. This paper has been arguing that it is critical to study both who prevails in agricultural policy and the actual rural landscape that emerges. Emphasizing structural change, and the growing share of the food market a relatively small group of farmers and processors like McCain Foods Ltd. occupies, frames big farms as the success story. It does so at the expense of a statistically significant group of smallscale farmers who have opted to resist policy directives. Agricultural policy has systematically aimed to increase production with the fewest number of farms, but throughout Canada and Europe small farmers have sought to retain their livelihoods. Decades ago these small farms were the status quo. Now they are emerging as key players in local food movement activities. What arises in the future depends upon the programs, policies and trade agreements implemented at local, national and international levels and the place small-scale agriculture is awarded in those policies. &
